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Top Executive Compensation, Regional  
Institutions and Chinese outward FDI  
 
Abstract  
Integrating agency and institutional theories, this paper examines the impact of top-executive 
compensation and regional institutions on the outward FDI (OFDI) of a sample of Chinese-listed 
firms. The results show that top-executive cash pay and equity ownership have a positive 
association with OFDI. Differing from previous studies focusing on cross-country institutional 
variances, we take variations in within-country institutions into account and find that regional 
institutions in terms of product markets, factor markets and legal systems play an important role 
in OFDI and positively moderate the governance role of managerial equity ownership.  
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Top Executive Compensation, Regional  
Institutions and Chinese outward FDI 
 
Introduction  
The impact of corporate governance on Outward FDI (OFDI) from emerging economies (EEs) 
has been recognised (Bhaumik, Driffield & Pal, 2010; Liu, Li & Xue, 2011; Strange et al., 
2009)
2
. While most existing studies of corporate governance in EE firms have mainly focused on 
the role of ownership and board composition in OFDI, the impact of top-executive compensation 
on OFDI decisions has received little attention (Filatotchev & Wright, 2011). In addition, prior 
studies on top-executive compensation have predominantly focused on an Anglo-American 
aspect and imposed a universal set of linkages between top-executive compensation and strategic 
choices without considering the distinct contexts in which firms are embedded, thus raising 
questions about the generalization of these findings in the context of EEs (Buck, Liu & 
Skovoroda, 2008). There is, therefore, a lack of research on executive compensation and OFDI 
within firms from EEs, such as China, where the economy is in the process of transition from a 
centrally planned to a market-based economy (Child & Tse, 2001). The role of corporate 
governance in general, and top executive compensation in particular, in such a context may differ 
from that of developed countries. 
Despite increasing emphasis on the role of, and differences between, institutions of home 
and host countries in the context of OFDI (Peng, Wang & Jiang, 2008), most existing studies 
regard within-country institutions as a homogeneous entity, with rare exceptions (Chan, Markino 
                                                 
2
An emerging economy can be defined as a country that satisfies two criteria: a rapid pace of economic development, and 
government policies favoring economic liberalization and the adoption of a free-market system (Hoskisson, et al., 2000: p.249). 
A recent study (Hoskisson et al., 2013) classifies China as a mid-range emerging economy between developed economies and 
traditional emerging economies.  
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& Isobe, 2010; Meyer & Nguyen, 2005). However, treating within-country institutions in such a 
way is inconsistent with the fact that large EEs are characterized by high levels of regional 
disparity, income inequalities and regional institutional diversity. These features may have a 
profound impact on EE firm internationalization.  
Few studies have examined the role of top executive compensation in OFDI decisions and 
the inter-relationship between institutional factors and executive compensation in the context of 
EEs. To fill this research gap, this study adopts an integrated framework which combines agency 
theory and institutional theory to examine whether top-executive compensation affects OFDI by 
Chinese firms. This approach helps provide new insights into how regional institutional diversity 
affects corporate governance behaviour and OFDI strategies. The findings from the study will 
provide a better understanding of the complex relationship between executive compensation, 
institutional factors and OFDI decisions.  
China represents an ideal laboratory for our research as the country is becoming a driving 
force of OFDI from EEs, and its OFDI increased dramatically from US$0.9 billion in 1990 to 
US$ 77.2 billion in 2012 (MOFCOM, 2013). In addition, China has adopted corporate 
governance concepts that were originally derived from developed economies. It is important to 
investigate how the adopted corporate governance practices interact with regional institutional 
environments and so affect firms’ strategic decisions. More importantly, China, with 31 
provinces, is well-known for its regional disparity and heterogeneous regional institutional 
environments (Meyer, 2008)
3
. The variation in regional institutional environments provides an 
                                                 
3
 According to the Economist (2011): “China is now the world's second-biggest economy, but some of its provinces by 
themselves would rank fairly high in the global league. …Shanghai's GDP per person is as high as Saudi Arabia's (at 
purchasing-power parity). …  At the other extreme, the poorest province, Guizhou, has an income per head close to that 
of India” (see more information in ‘Comparing Chinese provinces with countries’ at 
http://www.economist.com.hk/content/chinese_equivalents). 
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appropriate context to examine the role of regional institutions in OFDI through their direct 
effect, and the complex inter-relationship between institutional factors and executive 
compensation.  
The paper is structured as follows. The following section will focus on theoretical 
discussions and hypotheses development. Section 3 will describe our empirical model and data, 
and the results are presented in Section 4. Section 5 discusses the empirical findings; Section 6 
concludes with policy and managerial implications.  
 
Theoretical framework and hypotheses  
The substantial rise of OFDI from EEs has received increasing attention (Deng, 2009; Luo, 
et al., 2010; Rui & Yip, 2008). Existing research on EE OFDI suggests that OFDI strategic 
decisions are influenced by a variety of firm, industry, and country-related factors (Lu, et al., 
2011; Yamakawa, Peng, & Deeds, 2008). Extant research has been grounded in several 
theoretical perspectives, such as a learning perspective, resource-based view and institutional 
theory (Mathews, 2006; Yamakawa, et al., 2008). While some studies have found that firms from 
EEs consider OFDI as an effective way of obtaining advanced knowledge and catching up with 
Western MNEs (Deng, 2009; Mathews, 2006), others have shown that supportive government 
policies play an important role (Luo et al., 2010). A number of studies have adopted an 
integrated approach by examining how competitive advantages at firm level, industry 
competition and institutional environments jointly affect the motives for OFDI by Chinese firms 
(Lu, et al., 2011; Yamakawa, et al., 2008). The findings from existing studies have enhanced our 
understanding of the determinants of EE OFDI.  
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Firms undertaking OFDI, however, are facing great uncertainties and challenges as 
international exposure increases the level of uncertainty, which may result in strategic errors 
such as misunderstanding consumer tastes or neglecting local regulations, or problems in 
accessing distribution channels (Mitchell, Shaver & Yeung, 1992). In addition, increased 
internationalization may incur higher monitoring costs due to increased size and complexity 
(Hitt, Hoskission & Kim, 1997; Roth & O’Donnell, 1996). Several studies have examined the 
role of corporate governance in the internationalization of EE firms (Bhaumik et al., 2010; 
Filatotchev, et al., 2007). Bhaumik et al. (2010) have investigated the impact of the ownership 
structures on Indian firms’ OFDI decision and have shown that family firms, and firms with 
concentrated ownerships, are less likely to invest overseas. Filatotchev et al. (2007) have 
explored the location choices of Taiwanese firms in mainland China and have found that the 
ownership structure of the parent company plays an important role in its FDI decisions.  
Although existing studies have shown that executive compensation, as an important 
governance mechanism, influences firm strategies and outcomes, most prior studies have mainly 
examined the performance implications of executive compensation (Gomez-Mejia & Wiseman, 
1997; Rost & Osterloh, 2009) and how internationalization affects executive compensation 
(Oxelheim, & Randøy, 2005; Sanders & Carpenter, 1998). Few studies have explicitly examined 
the impact of top-executive compensation on OFDI decisions by EE firms.  
It is widely recognized that executive compensation is subject to institutional constraints, 
and its impact largely depends on the institutional environment within which firms operate 
(Aguilera & Jackson, 2003). This is particularly the case in EEs such as China, Russia and India 
where regional disparities and institutional diversity are a common feature (Granville & Leonard; 
2010; Meyer, 2008). Regional institutional variations in large EEs may result in diverse OFDI 
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decisions and affect the effectiveness of corporate governance. Hence, studying the impact of top 
executive compensation on OFDI should treat institutional characteristics as more than ‘research 
background’. In order to remedy this omission, this study employs both agency and institutional 
theories as analytical lenses to examine the role of top-executive compensation in OFDI.  
Agency theory has been widely applied to examine the relationship between firm 
performance, executive compensation and strategic choices (Brush, Bromiley & Hendrick, 2000; 
Datta et al., 2009), and is based on the assumption that there may be divergence in the interests 
of agents (executives) and principals (shareholders), with the former likely to behave according 
to self-interest (Gomez-Mejia & Wiseman, 1997). Hence, the theory argues that executive 
compensation can be used as an incentive for executives to align their interests with those of 
shareholders (Fama & Jensen, 1983). The optimal CEO pay would minimize agency costs 
(Gomez-Mejia & Wiseman, 1997). This approach theoretically underpins the two dimensions of 
incentive pay. On one hand, top-executive pay can be considered a motivational tool. As such it 
may incentivise managers to exhibit desirable behaviors and pursue feasible growth strategies, 
such as internationalization (Oxelheim, & Randøy, 2005; Sanders & Carpenter, 1998). On the 
other hand, executive compensation helps owners to reduce monitoring costs and narrow the 
divergence of interest between agents and principals (Buck, et al., 2008). In particular, the 
increased complexity associated with the degree and scope of internationalization makes it 
difficult for the board to monitor senior executives (Filatotchev & Wright, 2011). Hence, top-
executive compensation, especially equity-based incentives, is used as a pay reward which links 
top-executive pay to share price performance. This type of equity reward may lead to an increase 
in internationalization.  
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However, agency theory is ‘under-socialized’ (Aguilera & Jackson, 2003) and, on its own, 
may not be adequate to explain how executive compensation affects the strategic decisions of 
firms in the context of EEs. Prior studies on agency theory have concentrated on a static 
theorizing of the principal–agent perspective without considering the context in which agency 
theory issues are derived (Filatotchev & Wright, 2011).  
As discussed above, there exist considerable institutional variations across regions within 
China due to its gradual approach to economic and institutional reform (Child & Tse, 2001; 
Meyer, 2008). Regional/local governments are granted the authority and responsibility for 
regional economic development and they control about half of the total governmental budget due 
to decentralisation (Naughton, 1995). Local governments are able to implement policies which 
affect the development of product markets, factor markets, and market-intermediate institutions 
and legal systems.
4
 As a result, firms’ behaviour and strategic choices are largely affected by 
regional institutional environments (Schlevogt, 2001; Chan, Markino & Isobe, 2010; Gao et al., 
2010). According to the World Bank Group (2008), in Zhejiang Province, it takes 30 days to 
start a business, whereas in Qinghai Province, it takes 47 days to do so. Moreover, it is relatively 
easy for businesses to get credit in well-established regions. Businesses need 8 days to get credit 
from banks in Shanghai, but it takes 20 days to do so in Qinghai Province. These institutional 
differences affect the speed of responding to business opportunities in the international market 
by firms in different regions, thus resulting in differences in OFDI activities. Hence, institutional 
theory serves as an additional theoretical lens that allows consideration of the impact of regional 
                                                 
4 Factor markets refer to markets where the services of the factors of production, such as labor and capital, are exchanged in the 
labor market, the capital market, the market for raw materials and the market for management.  
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institutional environments on firm strategic choices directly and indirectly through their 
interaction with corporate governance factors.  
 
Top-Executive Compensation 
Among the factors affecting OFDI, top executives play an important role in the strategic 
decision-making process. Agency theorists (Jensen & Murphy, 1990) propose that top-executives 
are more likely to be significantly influenced by their remuneration and argue that the design of 
an agent’s compensation represents an important mechanism for mitigating agency problems and 
associated costs. The aim of such design is to ensure proper alignment of the interests of 
managers with those of owners. Thus, top-executive compensation acts as a mechanism through 
which a convergence in interests between the agent and principal can be achieved.  
OFDI decisions are interrelated organizational outcomes of the firm’s strategic dynamics 
and may depend upon the risk preferences of both managers and key stakeholders (Aulakh, 
Masaaki & Teegen, 2000). Despite the organizational complexity and risk associated with 
internationalization, by seeking resources and new markets through OFDI, firms are likely to 
create shareholder value. From an agency theory perspective, executive remuneration plays an 
important role in encouraging the creation of shareholder value, achieved in this case by the 
strategic choice of OFDI. Previous findings have suggested that top-executive pay has a direct 
impact on international diversification (Tihanyi et al., 2009). Moreover, some scholars have 
argued that executive compensation is positively related to the organizational complexity that 
executives manage and specifically to the level of internationalization (Sanders and Carpenter, 
1998). In addition, managers’ perceptions may change given the type of incentive. Hence, 
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executive compensation is crucial to the strategic decision-making of EE firms and may affect 
OFDI decisions (Filatotchev & Wright, 2011). There are two main reasons.  
First, top executives are more likely to be motivated to take on the challenges in pursuing 
growth via OFDI and exhibit behavior that is in the interest of shareholders when their rewards 
are at desirable levels (Mustee, Datta & Herrmann, 2008). In other words, top executives 
receiving a higher level of pay may be encouraged to devote more attention to OFDI in order to 
seek to maximize shareholder value. A high level of executive pay not only motivates them to 
handle the complexity of overseas operations, but also enables the firm to attract and retain 
experts who are capable of dealing with internationalization. Therefore, executive pay as a 
motivational tool may significantly affect senior managers’ willingness to engage in international 
expansion. 
Second, direct equity ownership helps to align management interests with those of 
shareholders (Murphy, 1999). Incentives that induce top executives to take a long-term view are 
likely to result in different choices than those with a short-term focus (DeFusco, Zorn & 
Johnson, 1991). Executive equity ownership helps to overcome the problem of the ‘short-
sightedness’ of top executives as they will still be eligible for future gains in their companies’ 
share price even if their tenure terminates (Wong, 2011). In other words, an increase in equity 
ownership makes executives’ wealth more dependent on their companies’ long-term 
performance. Hence, the alignment effect of managerial equity ownership may help to reduce the 
agency problem and provide an incentive for top executives to support internationalization, 
which may raise the competitiveness and performance of their companies in the long run 
(Jenkins & Seiler, 1990). Managerial equity ownership can also empower managers to initiate 
internationalization as a growth strategy (Zahra et al., 2000) and may encourage managerial risk-
11 
 
taking in internationalization (Rajgopal & Shevlin, 2002; Sanders & Hambrick, 2007). It may be 
in the top executive’s interest to undertake OFDI, as the increased size and scope of their firms 
through OFDI will increase their pay and prestige (Jensen & Murphy, 1990). In summary, we 
argue that managers with a high level of cash pay and equity ownership may be motivated to 
pursue internationalization strategy as a growth option and may respond more positively than 
they otherwise might to opportunities in the international market (Palmer & Wiseman, 1999). 
Therefore, we propose:  
  
Hypothesis 1a: Top-executive pay positively affects the extent of OFDI of Chinese firms.  
Hypothesis 1b: Top-executive equity ownership positively affects the extent of OFDI of 
Chinese firms.  
  
Regional Institutional Environments  
North (1990) defined institutions as the humanely devised constraints that structure 
organizational interaction through human agency; the institutional environment is composed of a 
set of social, legal and political tenets that govern economic activity. Thus, in a given 
environment, institutions define and limit the set of choices of individuals or organisations. In 
this sense, institutions are perfectly analogous ‘to the rules of the game’, (North, 1990, p. 3-4). 
Among the variety of formal institutions, governance as well as legal and regulatory institutions 
drive, to a large extent, business activities and provide support to social and economic 
institutions such as product and factor markets (Globerman & Shapiro, 2003).  
Previous studies on Chinese OFDI based on the institutional perspective have examined the 
role of government policy in promoting OFDI (Luo, et al., 2010; Lu, et al., 2011). However, 
these studies have narrowly focused on the impact of regulatory factors and state support. The 
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impact of different dimensions of the institutional environment, such as marketization and 
market supportive institutions across regions within China, is underexplored. Our research 
complements previous studies (Cui and Jiang, 2012; Lu, et al., 2011) by examining how different 
dimensions of regional institutional environments affect Chinese OFDI.  
Following decentralization, a step towards greater marketization, local governments in 
Chinese provinces have since assumed wide discretionary powers in managing the business 
environment in which local firms operate. Market-oriented reforms have resulted in decisive 
progress, but large gaps still exist among different regions (Fan et al., 2003). According to Fan et 
al. (2003), the variation in the institutional environments can be better understood by examining 
the process of marketization that is based on three major aspects: ‘degree of product-market 
development,’ ‘degree of factor-market development’ and ‘development of market- 
intermediaries and legal environment system’. Based on this classification, we examine three 
main aspects of regional institutional environments, including a product market, a factor market 
as well as market-intermediate institutions and legal systems. We argue that a fine-grained 
analysis of the effects of different aspects of institutional components on OFDI is important and 
enables us to capture the complexity of the different dimensions of regional institutional 
environments and firm internationalization, and their moderating effect on top executive 
compensation. 
In the context of a large EE, a region with a well-established institutional environment may 
have developed an effective product market, factor market as well as market-intermediate 
institutions and legal systems. Firms operating in a well-established regional institutional 
environment will have already been exposed to some market-based rules and will be able to 
develop capabilities which can be exploited by international expansion. First, a well-established 
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product market, including market-determined price setting and a low level of regional protection, 
is credited with legitimacy (Carroll and Hannan, 1995); this encourages new entrants, which 
increases competition (Arora and Gambardella 1997). The competitive pressure pushes firms to 
cut prices and improve product performance. The offsetting force of competition places a ceiling 
or threshold on the equilibrium number of firms (Carroll & Hannan, 1995), leading to the 
mortality, the exit or the seeking of new opportunities abroad. In particular, intensified 
competition in domestic regional markets may result in vigorous efforts to penetrate foreign 
markets in order to sustain growth, or even to fill capacity (Lu, et al., 2011). A well-functioning 
product market also helps firms to undertake OFDI by building foundations for international 
expansion, such as being familiar with market-based rules and increasing efficiency. In 
particular, the development of market mechanisms increases the efficiency of resource allocation 
in the industry, which helps firms to achieve economies of scale domestically, thus serving as a 
stepping-stone for international expansion (Gao et al., 2010).  
In addition, a well-developed factor market also helps firms to raise funds through the 
financial sector to undertake OFDI. However, in Chinese regions with underdeveloped 
institutional environments, the factor market is usually dominated by non-market forces and is 
often subject to local protection due to a lack of effective contract enforcement (Fan et al., 2010). 
Such an underdeveloped factor market may distort market competition and result in monopoly. 
Firms operating in such an environment may have few incentives to internationalize as they 
either enjoy preferential treatment in their regional markets or lack the capability to compete in 
foreign countries with market-based rules.  
Finally, market-intermediate institutions and legal systems determine the extent of protection 
for businesses, intellectual rights and consumers’ rights, and facilitate business transactions. This 
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suggests that institutional environments with better legal systems are more likely to support 
business initiatives. In the context of China, the economic reform starting in the late 1970s 
achieved great progress in its legal systems but with uneven regional improvements, especially in 
law enforcement. Fan et al. (2003) argue that outstanding lawyers and reputable law firms are 
mainly located in the politically and economically developed centers and coastal cities; whereas 
in the western and inland regions well-served law consultation and qualified auditing service are 
difficult to obtain. Relatedly, Wang et al. (2007) found that in the eastern coastal regions of 
China, or regions with better institutional environments, the degree of marketization is higher 
than that in the central and western regions, or regions with a poorer institutional environment.  
In the case of China as well as in general, therefore, a well-developed institutional 
environment is able to motivate local firms to improve efficiency and competitiveness. Well-
established regional institutional environments may also facilitate OFDI by providing an 
efficient common infrastructure, and by initiating supportive policies (McEvily & Zaheer, 1999). 
Firms from more developed institutional environments are more likely to have greater access to 
the resources and information required to engage in OFDI (Luo et al., 2010). The development of 
intermediate institutions also reduces the transaction and agency costs, and the uncertainties for 
firms in undertaking OFDI. Hence, we propose:  
Hypothesis 2: Well-developed regional institutional environments positively affect the 
extent of OFDI of Chinese firms.  
 
Interrelationships between Top Executive Compensation and Regional Institutional 
Environments  
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In the previous section we considered the direct effect of top-executive compensation and 
institutional factors on the OFDI of EE firms. However, these factors are not orthogonal and they 
may interact with each other. In other words, the relationship between executive compensation 
and OFDI may be moderated by institutional contexts in which firms are embedded. The 
effectiveness of executive incentives may be contingent on regional institutional factors, namely 
the development of product markets, factor markets and market-intermediate institutions and 
legal systems (Firth, Fung & Rui, 2007). These institutional factors may enhance the governance 
roles of executive compensation through affecting managerial behavior (Young et al., 2008).  
The institutional environment may affect managerial behaviour in a number of ways. First, 
product markets can act as a control mechanism on managerial behaviour (Hart, 1983). Firms in 
regions with well-developed product markets are able to rely on the market to set up prices and 
they face a low level of regional trade barriers. Such features of the product markets foster 
competition, and firms facing great competition at home are more likely to seek international 
expansion. Hence, increased competition may put pressure on top executives to undertake OFDI. 
In this way, well-established regional product markets help reinforce the positive effect of top- 
executive pay.  
Second, well-established factor markets act as an important monitoring mechanism which 
helps enhance the governance role of top-executive compensation. Owing to the power derived 
from the lending and advice they provide to firms, financial institutions may influence the 
effectiveness of corporate governance. Studies in other governance contexts have shown the role 
of banks in the determination and disclosure of executive compensation (Chizema, 2008). 
However, in China the distribution of financial institutions is uneven across regions. For 
example, the headquarters of the largest state banks and all big commercial banks, including 
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foreign banks, are mainly located in the eastern region. Indeed, the concentration of banks in the 
eastern provinces enhances liquidity provision to firms in these provinces (Brandt & Zhu, 2000) 
accompanied by more bank monitoring on various governance issues including executive 
compensation.  
 A flexible and functional labor market puts considerable pressure on top executives who 
may be forced to make strategic decisions on behalf of stakeholders. It also helps minimize 
executives’ opportunistic behavior, given that hiring and firing managers becomes relatively easy 
(Shinkle & Kriauciunas, 2010). Hence, a fluid regional labor market is able to restrain managers’ 
opportunism and induce them to make value-enhancing strategic choices, such as OFDI. By the 
same logic, a well-established capital market which acts as a monitoring mechanism helps 
scrutinize managers (Shinkle & Kriauciunas, 2010). In addition, effective market-intermediate 
institutions and legal systems are able to protect investors and reduce the possibility of 
managerial opportunism, thus lowering agency costs (La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes & Shleifer, 
1998). In summary, well developed regional product and factor markets, as well as effective 
market- intermediate institutions and legal systems, play an important role in monitoring top 
executives and reduce the possibility that top executives may behave opportunistically by 
pursuing their self-interest instead of the long-run growth of the company, and may help 
facilitate OFDI through reinforcing the positive impact of top executive compensation on OFDI 
decisions. Hence, we hypothesize  
Hypothesis 3a: Well-developed regional institutional environments positively moderate 
the impact of top-executive pay on the extent of OFDI of Chinese firms.  
Hypothesis 3b: Well-developed regional institutional environments positively moderate 
the impact of top-executive equity ownership on the extent of OFDI of Chinese firms.  
17 
 
 
Data and methodology  
Sample 
We test our hypotheses based on a sample of Chinese firms that were publicly listed on the 
Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges. We chose 2002 as the starting year for two reasons: 
first, OFDI by Chinese firms surged after China’s access to WTO at the end of 2001, and second, 
annual reports for years earlier than 2002 provide less detailed information on subsidiaries. 
Constrained by the availability of regional institutional indices, the sample period ended in 2007. 
We focused on firms whose annual reports can be obtained from the Shanghai and Shenzhen 
stock exchanges, the website of the China Security Regulation Committee (CSRC), and the 
websites of listed firms for the years 2002 through 2007. We collected information on overseas 
subsidiaries from listed firms’ annual reports for 2002-2007. We excluded firms in the financial 
sector as financial firms tend to have different financial structures and ways of measuring their 
performance and internationalization (Lien, Piesse, Strange, & Filatotchev, 2005). In addition, 
the financial sector is heavily regulated by the Chinese government. Hence, it would be difficult 
to examine the role of the regional institutional environment in such a tightly regulated sectoral 
context. Our sample consisted of 1,071 listed firms in the manufacturing sector. All of the 
variables used in the study were collected from the annual reports of the sample firms except for 
the measurements of regional institutional indices.  
 
Dependent variables:  
We calculated two dependent variables to measure OFDI. The first dependent variable, the 
Extent of OFDI across different countries, is defined as  *ln(1 )c cc S S , where Sc is the share of 
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investment in country c to total foreign investment and ln(1/Sc) is the logarithm of the inverse of 
the investment share. The measure considers both the number of countries in which the firm 
operates and the relative importance of each country to the firm (Hitt et al., 1997). The second 
dependent variable is measured by the Share of OFDI in firms’ total investment.  
Independent variables:  
There were two main forms of top-executive compensation in Chinese-listed firms during the 
sample period. One consisted of salary and bonuses. The other was equity ownership. Stock 
options were virtually absent within Chinese-listed firms. Therefore, we used two measures to 
proxy top-executive compensation. The first measure was top-executive (TE) pay, including 
salaries and bonuses. This was calculated as average pay for the three highest-paid top 
executives at 2000 prices as the disclosure of top-executive pay was only reported as aggregate 
salary and bonuses for the three highest-paid executives in the annual reports of Chinese-listed 
firms
3
. We used the log value of TE pay in our estimations. The second measure, top-executive 
(TE) equity ownership, is expressed as the average percentage of total equity in a firm that is 
owned by the three highest-paid top executives based on prior studies (Goranova, et al., 2007; 
Himmelberg et al., 1999; Lu, et al., 2010).  
Although institutions could either be formal (e.g. legal and economic) or informal (such 
as culture), we focused on the former for two reasons. First, China as an economy in transition is 
witnessing rapid formal institutional changes from central planning to a market economy. 
Second, unlike informal institutions, formal ones have a more direct effect on top-executive pay 
and business decisions such as OFDI (Buck et al., 2008). The institutional indices used in the 
study were constructed by The National Economic Research Institute (NERI) of China and the 
                                                 
3
Year 2000 prices were used to convert the nominal executive pay into a real variable by deducting the impact of inflation on 
top executive pay. Our sample starts in 2002, and China jointed the WTO in 2001. Therefore, using year 2000 prices as a base 
year prices enables us to take the impact of China’s WTO entry on prices which may be reflected in executive pay. 
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China Reform Foundation (Fan, Wang & Zhu, 2010).
5
 The NERI indices are the official and 
most comprehensive measures of China’s multifaceted institutional development and have been 
widely used in recent studies (e.g., Du, Lu, & Tao, 2008; Gao et al., 2010; Wang, Wong, & Xia, 
2008). Raw data used in the construction of the NERI indices were mainly from the statistical 
yearbooks of the National Statistics Bureau of China, which contain statistical information on 
prices, the administration of industry and commerce, the courts, consumers’ associations, and 
also government statistical information collected from bank surveys, surveys of entrepreneurs, 
and surveys of rural households. The indices covered the period 2002-2007 and have not been 
updated beyond 2007, thus defining our sample period. The NERI indices comprehensively 
capture the provincial differences in institutional environments over time and are categorized 
into five dimensions: (1) the relationship between government and markets; (2) the development 
of the non-state enterprise sector; (3) the development of product markets; (4) the development 
of factor markets and (5) the development of market-intermediate institutions and legal systems. 
Detailed information on how each dimension was assessed is presented in Appendix Table 1. 
As we focus on how the impact of the development of economic institutions and legal 
systems on top executive compensation and OFDI, we mainly use three indices, namely the 
index of product markets, the index of factor markets and the index of market-intermediate 
institutions and legal environment. Specifically, the index of product markets is assessed by the 
extent of market-determined product prices and the reduction of local protectionism or local 
trade barriers. The factor market index is measured by the development of the financial sector, 
the extent of labor mobility in labor markets and the ratio of technology transactions to technical 
                                                 
5
 For detailed calculation of the NERI index, please refer to Fan, G., Wang, X. & Zhu, H. (2010). NERI Index of 
  Marketization for China’s Provinces: 2009 Report (in Chinese), Economic Science Press, Beijing. 
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personnel. The index of market-intermediate institutions and legal systems is measured by the 
development of market intermediate mechanisms and the extent to which legal systems protect 
businesses, intellectual property rights and consumers’ rights. Taking year 2007 as an example, 
Shanghai had the highest indices in terms of factor markets (11.93) and market-intermediate 
institutions and legal systems (16.61), and Zhejiang Province had the highest index of product 
markets, whereas Qinghai Province had the lowest indices of product markets (5.52) and market-
intermediate institutions and legal systems (2.79), and Xinjiang had the lowest index of factor 
markets (2.42). These indices show substantial differences in institutional environments across 
provinces in China (see Appendix Table 2 for more details). 
 
Control variables: 
State ownership may affect firms’ internationalization strategies. Thus, we controlled for state 
shareholding, which is calculated as the percentage of shares owned by the central government, 
local governments and government related agencies, to capture the effect of direct state 
intervention. We followed the methodology of Delios, Wu and Zhou (2006) to categorize 
ownership in Chinese-listed firms according to the ultimate identity of shareholders, and updated 
the ownership category data for the sample period. We used a dummy variable to capture the 
impact of the government’s industrial policy towards OFDI, taking the value 1 if the industries 
are prioritized by the government, which encourages Chinese firms to invest in these industries 
abroad (zero otherwise) based on the guidance for overseas investment issued by the Chinese 
government (MOFCOM, 2004). We also control for foreign shareholding which was measured 
as the percentage of equity shares owned by foreign investors. 
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We controlled for the impact of board directors and independent directors by including the 
variables of board size and independent directors in our estimations (Lu et al., 2010). The former 
was measured as the total number of board directors, while the latter was calculated as the ratio 
of the number of independent directors to the total number of board directors. We also controlled 
for top executives’ international experience in OECD countries. This is measured as a dummy 
variable which is value 1 if top executives studied and/or worked in OECD countries, and zero 
otherwise. We collected such information from the “Profile of Directors and Senior Managers” 
section of the company’s annual reports. By including this control variable, we aimed to reflect 
the fact that China has recently attracted a large number of return migrants who worked and/or 
were educated in OECD countries and have now returned to China (Liu et al., 2010). These 
returnees may play an important role in the internationalization of Chinese firms. We controlled 
for firm size since larger firms typically have more slack resources for internationalization, 
which is measured by the logarithm of firm total assets. Firm age is controlled for as a proxy of 
experience and resources. We controlled for a firm’s previous performance as measured by the 
return on assets in the previous year (Mani, Antia, & Rindfleisch, 2007). We also included the 
logarithm of intangible assets to control for the impact of firms’ technological capability on 
internationalization. According to the Chinese accounting standards, intangible assets are defined 
as long-term non-monetary assets without physical forms held by enterprises, including patents, 
non-patent technology, trademarks, copyrights, land use rights and concessions. We used 
industry dummies to control for industry effects in the manufacturing sector and the primary 
sector. We also controlled for time effects by using year dummies.  
 
Methodology 
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The relationship between top-executive compensation and OFDI is not clear-cut, and reverse 
causation from OFDI to executive pay may exist (Sanders & Carpenter, 1998). Endogeneity 
arises when the factors that are supposed to affect a particular outcome, depend themselves on 
that outcome. In order to identify whether there is a reciprocal relationship (i.e. endogeneity) 
from OFDI to executive pay, we first conducted panel Granger causality tests
6
. If reverse 
causation exists, the impact of executive compensation on internationalization would be 
overstated when using the OLS. Instead, the generalized method of moments (GMM) should be 
applied in order to take reverse causation into account. The GMM is widely used to deal with the 
endogeneity problem as it is sufficiently flexible to control for unobserved heterogeneity and 
reverse causality. In particular, Blundell and Bond (1998) suggest that GMM estimation is an 
appropriate approach to short panel data since it allows for a large set of instruments of first 
differences and, therefore, exploits fully all of the available moment conditions. This yields 
better predictions for the endogenous explanatory variables in the finite sample.  
 
Empirical results  
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics and the correlation matrix for the variables used in this 
study. According to our data, the highest-paid three top executives, on average, earn 2.7 million 
RMB which is equivalent to US$344,000, and hold 3% of the total shares of their companies. 
The average number of board members is nine and that of independent directors is three. The 
state share holdings account for 44% of the ownership of the sample firms, whereas the average 
                                                 
5 Granger causality tests are widely used to identify the causal relationship between variables (Granger, Huangb & Yang, 2000; 
Nair-Reichert & Weinhold, 2001). Variable X is said to cause variable Y in the Granger sense if variable Y can be better 
explained when the lagged variable X is taken into account. 
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foreign share holdings are about 5%. We have compared whether there are differences in the 
main characteristics of the sample firms based on state share holdings, using 10% and 60% of 
state share holdings as cutting points. The results show that firms with over 60% of state 
holdings have undertaken more OFDI. There was no significant difference in top-executive pay 
in terms of their salary between firms with majority state holdings and those without. However, 
top executives in firms with majority state holdings own fewer shares than those in privately 
owned firms. 
To provide detailed information on how top-executive pay was designed, we interviewed 
eight top executives from the sample firms, including five CEOs, two Vice Presidents and one 
Chief Finance Officer (CFO). According to our interviews, the value of total shares owned by 
top executives is greater than their salary. Seven interviewees confirmed that the value of the 
total shares they hold is more than five times of their salary. The value of shares rewarded 
annually accounts for 30%-40% of their salary. They all expressed the view that equity 
ownership has become an increasingly important mechanism of performance-related pay for top 
executives. All our interviewees indicated that they were given their companies’ shares directly 
and were also offered shares at less than 20% of the market prices, as pay rewards. The interview 
evidence indicates that fixed salary accounted for between 50% -70% of the total pay. The rest of 
pay is linked to performance. While most case companies used profits and sales growth as 
performance measures, one company also linked performance indicators to the specific positions 
of top executives. For example, the Chief Technology Officer’s performance was measured 
against R&D project completion and new product development, whereas the marketing director’s 
performance was measured against sales growth and an increase in market share.  
24 
 
Apart from independent board members, the board of directors includes top executives and 
shareholder representatives based on their share ownership. Top executives, as non-independent 
directors, account for more than 50% of board members, whereas one third of board members 
are independent directors. On average, there are five top executives in the sample firms. It is 
unlikely that independent directors become the majority. Our interviewees stated that the State 
does not have direct involvement in selecting the board of directors even in State shareholding 
companies.  
The sample firms invested in 63 countries, as shown in Table 2, and their overseas 
investment accounts for nearly 11% of total investment. According to interview evidence, the 
sample firms have undertaken merger and acquisitions or established wholly-owned subsidiaries 
in developed countries, but have formed joint ventures as the entry mode in other emerging 
economies, such as in Africa and Asia. Most of the variables have the expected signs. There is a 
positive correlation between the two top-executive compensation variables and the two measures 
of OFDI.  
Insert Tables 1 and 2 near here 
The results from the causality tests summarised in Table 3 reveal the existence of reverse 
causation from internationalization to executive pay, suggesting that the two executive 
compensation variables are not exogenous. Based on the results from the causality tests, we 
adopted the GMM as our estimation method and used lagged first differences of dependent and 
independent variables as instrumental variables which are commonly used to address the 
endogeneity problem in GMM estimation (Baum, Schaffer, & Stillman, 2003). The consistency 
of the GMM estimator depends on the validity of the instrumental variables used in the 
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regression. We addressed this issue by conducting the Sargan test which is used to test whether 
the instrumental variables are uncorrelated to residuals and whether they are acceptable 
instruments. The insignificant results from the Sargan test in Tables 4 and 5 indicate that the 
instrumental variables are appropriate. 
 
Insert Table 3 near here 
We use two proxies, Extent of OFDI and Share of OFDI as the dependent variables. Table 4 
and Table 5 present the results using GMM estimators. Extent of OFDI is the dependent variable 
in Model 1 – Model 7, whereas Model 8 – Model 14 are estimated using Share of OFDI as the 
dependent variable. Model 1 and Model 8 include controls only and this helps to verify whether 
the main independent variables contributed to the explanatory power of the models used. The 
results show that the adjusted R
2
 value is improved when the explanatory variables and 
interaction terms are included in the models in Tables 4&5. For example, when the index of 
market-intermediate institutions and legal systems was added, the adjusted R
2
 value increased to 
0.153, showing that the variable of market-intermediate institutions and legal systems has greater 
explanatory power for the dependent variable, OFDI. The results of Models 1 and 8 show that 
the variable of foreign shareholding is positive and statistically significant, indicating that 
foreign ownership has a positive impact on Extent of OFDI and Share of OFDI. The variable of 
state shareholdings is positive, but insignificant, whereas firms in the industries which are 
prioritized by the government for overseas investment tend to undertake OFDI. The variable of 
board size is negative and statistically significant in Model 8, suggesting that the larger the 
board, the less the firm undertook overseas investment. This may indicate that larger boards have 
difficulty reaching consensus on important decisions, such as OFDI strategic decisions, or may 
have a slow response to opportunities in foreign countries (Golden and Zajac, 2001; Van Den 
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Berghe and Levrau, 2004). The variable of independent directors has a positive sign, but is 
statistically insignificant. 
The variable of returnee executives is positive and significant, and the result suggests that 
executives with international experience are more likely to be the promoters of 
internationalization. The coefficient of the variable of intangible assets is negative and 
significant, indicating that Chinese-listed firms tend to undertake OFDI to seek strategic assets 
rather than exploiting their intangible assets. Firm size and firm age positively affect 
internationalization, suggesting that large firms and well-established firms are actively engaged 
in internationalization. However, the variable of lagged returns on assets is insignificant, 
showing firm performance is not a fundamental force in firm internationalization.  
Insert Tables 4 and 5 near here 
The results of Models 2-4 in Table 4 and Models 9-11 in Table 5, which add the explanatory 
variables, show that the executive pay and equity ownership variables are statistically significant, 
suggesting that executive compensation positively affects OFDI, thus supporting Hypothesis 1a 
and Hypothesis 1b. We further interpret the main coefficients as follows. It can be seen that one 
standard deviation of increase in top-executive pay leads to an increase in Extent of OFDI, 
ranging from 0.2 percent to 0.7 percent when the three institutional indices were used in the 
estimations, whereas one standard deviation of increase in top-executive equity ownership results 
in an increase in Extent of OFDI, ranging from 2.5 percent to 8.4 percent (Models 2-4 in Table 
4). Moreover, one standard deviation of increase in top-executive pay is associated with 1.9 
percent to 2.6 percent increase in Share of OFDI, respectively, whereas one standard deviation of 
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increase in executive equity ownership leads to an increase in Share of OFDI, ranging from 37.5 
percent to 38.6 percent (Models 9-11 in Table 5).  
The three institutional indices are positive and significant, thus confirming that well-
established institutional environments in terms of product markets, factor markets and market-
intermediate institutions and legal systems help firms to undertake OFDI as hypothesised in H2. 
Specifically, one standard deviation of increase in the indices of product markets, factor markets 
and market-intermediate institutions and legal systems leads to an increase in Extent of OFDI, 
ranging from 0.3 percent to 1.1 percent (Models 2-4 in Table 4). Similarly, one standard 
deviation of increase in the indices leads to an increase in Share of OFDI, ranging from 0.8 
percent to 1.5 percent (Models 9-11 in Table 5).  
In Models 5-7, and Models 12-14, the interaction effects between the variables of executive 
compensation and the institutional indices were taken into account. The interaction terms 
between the three institutional indices and the variable of executive equity ownership are 
positive and significant, indicating that institutional development in terms of product markets, 
factor markets and market-intermediate institutions and legal systems positively moderates the 
governance role of executive equity ownership. However, the interaction terms between top-
executive pay and the indices of factor markets and market-intermediate institutions and legal 
systems are insignificant. Hence, Hypothesis 3a receives partial support. The results show that 
regional institutional environments, including product markets, factor markets and market-
intermediate institutions and legal systems, positively moderate the impact of equity-based 
incentives on OFDI by Chinese-listed firms, thus supporting Hypothesis 3b. It is shown that one 
standard deviation of increase in the three institutional indices enhances the impact of top- 
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executive equity ownership on Extent of OFDI, ranging from 0.6 percent to 1 percent (Models 5-
7 in Table 4). In Models 12-14 in Table 5, one standard deviation of increase in the indices of 
product markets, factor markets and market-intermediate institutions and legal systems 
strengthens the impact of top-executive equity ownership on Share of OFDI, ranging from 4.2 
percent to 6.1 percent. However, only the index of product markets has a significant moderating 
effect on top-executive pay; one standard deviation of increase in the index of product markets 
enhances the impact of top-executive pay on Share of OFDI by 0.1 percent.  
Discussion  
This study examines the impact of executive compensation and regional institutions on OFDI for 
a sample of Chinese-listed firms from 2002-2007. Integrating agency theory with institutional 
analysis, we extend the existing literature by investigating how top-executive compensation and 
regional institutions jointly influence OFDI decisions. We find that top-executive compensation 
in terms of cash pay and equity ownership is positively associated with OFDI. The finding shows 
that executive compensation plays a key role in OFDI. Executive compensation is an important 
mechanism through which managers are motivated to adopt an OFDI strategy. Executive equity 
ownership is only a recent phenomenon in China but it is an increasing trend even though it is 
still relatively low by international standards. Our results on executive equity ownership may 
reflect the fact that market-oriented executive compensation has encouraged managers’ 
willingness to make viable and longer-term decisions such as internationalization.  
Our findings show that heterogeneous regional institutional environments significantly affect 
OFDI. Firms in provinces with well-established institutional environments are more likely to 
undertake OFDI due to competitive product markets, efficient factor markets and sufficient 
support from market-intermediate institutions and legal systems. We further investigate the 
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complex interrelationship between top-executive compensation and regional institutional 
environments. We explicitly examine the interplay between executive compensation and these 
institutional factors, and investigate how the latter affect firm strategic choices indirectly through 
their interaction with the former. Our findings show that well-established product markets, factor 
markets and market-intermediate institutions and legal systems play an effective monitoring role 
and help reduce managerial opportunistic behavior, thus enhancing the corporate roles of equity-
based incentives. OFDI decisions are jointly affected by equity-based incentives and regional 
institutional development, and well-developed regional environments encourage top executives 
to undertake OFDI. 
Our study makes a number of important contributions to the existing literature. First, 
adopting an integrated framework which combines both agency and institutional theories, we 
conduct a systematic and detailed analysis of executive compensation, regional institutions and 
OFDI by Chinese-listed firms. This approach enables us to investigate the interrelationship 
between executive compensation and institutional environments in which agency issues are 
derived. While institutional factors have remained as ‘background’ in most studies on corporate 
governance, especially the role of executive compensation, our study has brought institutional 
factors from background to forefront, thus providing new insights into how the institutional 
environment affects corporate governance behaviour and OFDI strategies.  
Second, challenging prior studies which treat within-country institutions as a homogeneous 
variable, we explicitly examine how variations in regional institutional environments affect 
OFDI directly and indirectly through interaction with executive compensation. Thus, the study is 
able to take the special characteristics of a large EE into account. More importantly, 
disaggregating broad institutional environments into three institutional factors, we have found 
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that well-established product markets, factor markets and market-intermediate institutions and 
legal systems play an effective monitoring role and help reduce managerial opportunistic 
behavior, thus enhancing the corporate roles of equity-based incentives. Hence, the findings from 
the study help identify which institutional factors are more salient in shaping the complex 
relationship between top-executive compensation and regional institutional environments. Our 
detailed analysis of different aspects of regional institutional environments also extends prior 
studies which have mainly focused on the role of government policy and state support in OFDI 
by Chinese firms.  
Third, unlike previous research which assumes straightforward causation between 
independent and dependent variables, we employ an empirical method and panel data to take 
reverse causation into account. In particular, the results from our causality test show that there 
are reciprocal causation effects between executive pay and OFDI and assuming one-way 
causation may lead to the overestimation of the effect of executive pay or internationalization.  
 
Managerial Relevance 
Our study examines the impact of executive compensation and regional institutional 
environments on OFDI, and offers a number of policy and managerial implications. First, our 
findings show that there is a positive association between top-executive compensation and OFDI 
decisions by controlling the reverse causation. This suggests that executive compensation, 
including top-executive equity ownership, helps to mitigate principal-agent conflicts in Chinese- 
listed firms. Undertaking OFDI is considered an effective means of achieving better performance 
or overcoming domestic constraints, such as fierce domestic competition. International 
expansion may help to increase sales growth and share prices and in turn, top executives may 
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benefit through an increase in performance-related pay. Top executives are more likely to be 
motivated to undertake OFDI when their performance-related pay is directly linked to 
international sales growth. Hence, executive compensation should be designed to fit firms’ 
international expansion strategies and motivate senior managers to pursue such strategies. 
Second, our results show that well-established regional institutional environments in terms of 
product markets, factor markets, and market-intermediate institutions and legal systems 
encourage firms to undertake OFDI. Hence, policy makers not only promote OFDI through 
direct state support, but also take measures to foster the development of product and factor 
markets, and market-intermediate institutions and legal systems. Well-established institutional 
environments may act as a substitute for direct state support. Finally, our findings indicate that 
the impact of executive equity ownership is contingent on regional institutional environments. 
This suggests that developing regional institutional environment not only helps to promote OFDI 
directly, but also indirectly affects the effectiveness of executive equity ownership. Hence, 
developing these institutional factors is a crucial task facing the governments of EEs.  
Limitations and future studies  
Notwithstanding the relevance and novelty of this study, we identify some limitations and 
suggest avenues for further research. First, our sample contains only Chinese-listed firms, while 
unlisted firms, usually smaller ones, were not included in the study. Consequently, a full 
investigation of the role of executive compensation on internationalization in wider 
organisational contexts is still awaited. Second, only aggregate salary and bonuses for the three 
HPEs are disclosed in Chinese-listed companies. Using average top-three director pay in our 
estimation may lack variation relative to individual pay and may have limited power to reveal the 
complex relationship between executive pay and internationalisation. Future studies should 
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further verify the impact of executive compensation on OFDI when more fine-grained data on 
individual top-executive compensation are available. Third, our study only focuses on whether 
firms undertook OFDI during the sample period, but we were unable to examine how executive 
compensation affects entry mode selection due to data availability. Future research should 
investigate the role of executive compensation in entry mode choices. Finally, our study has 
taken endogeneity into account using the GMM, which presents an extension of prior studies in 
this area, and the results show that OFDI of Chinese-listed firms is jointly determined by 
multilevel factors including regional institutional environments and a firm’s executive 
compensation. Future studies could extend the analysis by adopting a multilevel analysis 
technique. This multilevel analysis may help to provide a more complete picture of the OFDI by 
EE firms.  
 
Conclusion  
Using panel data analysis, we examine the impact of top-executive compensation and 
subnational institutions on OFDI for a sample of Chinese-listed firms. We found a positive 
association between top-executive compensation and OFDI in Chinese-listed companies by 
controlling reverse causation from internationalization to executive compensation. Our findings 
indicate that regional institutional environments are positively associated with OFDI. We have 
further investigated the interaction effect between regional institutional environments and top-
executive compensation. The results suggest that regional institutional environments positively 
moderate the governance role of executive equity ownership. Our findings call for more studies 
from different countries to further unpack the complex relationship between executive 
compensation and OFDI.  
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Table 1: Correlation matrix 
 Mean  Std. Dev. 1  2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
1 Share of OFDI  0.106 0.235  1.000                
2 Extent of OFDI 0.016 0.078  0.445  1.000               
3 TE pay 11.59 1.237 0.093 0.106 1.000              
4 TE equity 
ownership  0.003 0.031  0.053  0.016  0.031  1.000   
  
  
      
5 Index of 
product markets  8.677 1.355  0.166  0.106  0.182  0.057  1.000  
  
  
      
6 Index of factor 
Markets 5.978 2.755  0.160  0.110 0.215  0.038 0.467 1.000 
  
  
      
7 Index of market 
institutions and 
legal systems 7.024 3.410  0.151  0.092  0.185  0.036 0.446 0.890 
 
 
1.000 
 
  
      
8 State 
shareholdings  
 
0.438 
 
0.183 -0.019 -0.029  0.003 -0.037 -0.047 -0.008  -0.033 
 
1.000   
      
9 TEs’ 
international 
experience 0.037 0.189  0.106  0.054  0.042 -0.018  0.112  0.104  0.102 -0.019  1.000  
      
10 Policy 
orientated 
industry  0.554 0.497  0.104 -0.023 -0.100  0.036 -0.172  0.105  0.089 -0.052 -0.001 1.000 
      
11 Foreign 
shareholdings 0.047 7.193  0.150  0.158  0.115 -0.011  0.096  0.090  0.091 -0.086  0.132  0.092  1.000 
     
12 Board size 9.698 2.212 -0.016  0.007  0.099 -0.012 -0.050 -0.043 -0.038  0.030  0.040 -0.045  0.073 1.000     
13 Independent 
directors 0.327 0.073  0.003 -0.005 -0.011  0.017  0.095  0.126  0.086 -0.013  0.016  0.002 -0.143 -0.230  1.000 
   
14 Intangible 
assets 0.041 0.059 -0.083 -0.057 -0.089  0.026 -0.070 -0.059 -0.081 -0.029  0.001  0.014 -0.033 -0.066  0.034  1.000 
  
15 Firm size 11.393 1.555  0.172  0.129  0.276 -0.029  0.162  0.163  0.147 -0.018  0.085  0.065  0.177  0.211 -0.078 -0.178  1.000  
16 Firm age 12.845 3.943  0.037  0.057  0.020 -0.073  0.167  0.118  0.146  0.010  0.014 -0.133  0.020 -0.053  0.029  0.063 -0.122  1.000 
17 Return on 
assets(t-1)  0.015 0.082  0.066  0.051  0.180  0.041  0.061  0.083  0.082 -0.013  0.017 -0.018  0.073  0.085 -0.030 -0.097  0.391 -0.108 
Note: 1. All correlation coefficients more than 0.031 or less than –0.031 are significant at the 5% level or higher. 
     2. TE denotes top executive, and TE pay was measured in the log value.  
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Table 2: The destinations of OFDI by the sample firms  
in the period of 2002-2007 
Destination Destination Destination 
Afghanistan Hungary Romania 
Antigua & 
Barbuda India Russia 
Argentina Indonesia South Africa 
Australia Italy Samoa 
Bangladesh Japan Saudi Arabia 
Belgium Kazakhstan Singapore 
Bermuda Korea Rep. Spain 
Br. Virgin Is Laos, PDR Suriname 
Brazil Liberia Sweden 
Bulgaria Luxembourg Switzerland 
Canada Macau Tadzhikistan 
Cayman Is Malaysia Tanzania 
Congo Malta Thailand 
Croatia Rep Mexico Turkey 
Czech Rep Mongolia 
United Arab 
Emirates 
Denmark Netherlands United Kingdom 
Ecuador Nigeria United States 
Finland Pakistan Venezuela 
France Panama Vietnam 
Germany Philippines  
Ghana Poland  
Honduras Portugal  
 
 
 
 
Table 3: Results from the Panel Causality Test  
Note: 1. *, ** and *** represent significance at the 0.05, 0.01 and 0.001 levels, respectively. 
     2. TE denotes top executive, and TE pay was measured in the log value.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Causality F test Inferences 
Extent of OFDI  TE pay  8.120*** Yes 
Share of OFDI  TE pay    5.801*** Yes 
Extent of OFDI   TE equity ownership  4.078*** Yes 
Share of OFDI   TE equity ownership  11.787*** Yes 
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Table 4: The impact of top executive compensation and subnational institutions 
on extent of OFDI  
 
Variables Dependent variable: Extent of OFDI 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
TE pay 
  
0.002*** 
(0.001) 
0.007*** 
(0.001) 
0.002*** 
(0.001)  
0.002*** 
(0.002) 
0.002*** 
(0.002)  
0.001*** 
(0.002)  
TE equity ownership 
  
0.025*** 
(0.002) 
0.084*** 
(0.006) 
0.025*** 
(0.002) 
0.031*** 
(0.003) 
0.032*** 
(0.001) 
0.023*** 
(0.003) 
Index of product markets 
(IE1) 
 0.005*** 
(0.004)   
0.001 
(0.004)    
Index of factor markets  
(IE2) 
 
 
0.011*** 
(0.002) 
 
 
0.009 
(0.002) 
 
Index of market 
 intermediate institutions 
 and legal systems (IE3) 
 
 
 0.003*** 
(0.001) 
 
 0.001 
(0.001) 
 
TE pay X IE1      
0.002 
(0.000) 
  
TE equity ownership X IE1 
    
0.008** 
(0.003) 
  
TE pay X IE2  
   
  0.000 
(0.002) 
 
TE equity ownership X IE2 
   
  0.010*** 
(0.004) 
 
TE pay X IE3 
   
   0.001 
(0.000) 
TE equity ownership X IE3  
   
   0.006*** 
(0.002) 
 
Control variables     
    
Policy orientated industry 
 
0.042*** 
(0.005) 
0.040*** 
(0.003) 
0.037*** 
(0.006) 
0.040*** 
(0.003) 
0.021*** 
(0.006) 
0.020*** 
(0.006) 
0.011*** 
(0.005) 
State shareholdings  0.001 
(0.000)  
0.000 
(0.000) 
0.001 
(0.002) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
0.001 
(0.000) 
Foreign shareholdings  
0.001*** 
(0.002) 
0.001*** 
(0.001) 
0.002*** 
(0.002) 
0.002** 
(0.002) 
0.001 
0.001 
0.001† 
0.002 
0.001 
0.002 
Board size 
 
-0.008 
(0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.000) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.000) 
-0.001 
(0.000) 
-0.001 
(0.000) 
-0.001 
(0.000) 
Independent directors 
  
0.025 
(0.004) 
0.001 
(0.002) 
0.001 
(0.003) 
0.001 
(0.003) 
0.001 
(0.003) 
0.003 
(0.002) 
0.002 
(0.001) 
TEs’ international 
 experience  
0.076** 
(0.005) 
0.006* 
(0.001) 
0.010* 
(0.008) 
0.006* 
(0.002) 
0.004* 
(0.003) 
0.005 
(0.003) 
0.007 
(0.004) 
Intangible assets 
 
-0.040* 
(0.009) 
-0.024** 
(0.001) 
-0.036** 
(0.004) 
-0.025** 
(0.006) 
-0.023** 
(0.004) 
-0.020** 
(0.004) 
-0.005 
(0.004) 
Firm size  
0.007*** 
(0.001) 
0.004*** 
(0.001) 
0.004*** 
(0.002) 
0.004*** 
(0.002)  
0.004** 
(0.001) 
0.004** 
(0.002) 
0.003** 
(0.002) 
Firm age 
  
0.001*** 
(0.003) 
0.001*** 
(0.004) 
0.001*** 
(0.004) 
0.001*** 
(0.004)  
0.001** 
(0.003)  
0.001** 
(0.003) 
0.003** 
(0.003) 
Return on assets(t-1) 
 
0.012 
(0.014) 
0.001 
(0.002) 
0.004 
(0.018) 
0.001 
(0.002) 
0.003 
(0.002) 
0.003 
(0.002) 
0.003 
(0.002) 
Adjusted R-squared 0.062 0.115 0.127 0.153 0.118 0.134 0.158 
Sargan test  0.109 0.157 0.273 0.148 0.170 0.231 0.119 
Observations 5355 5355 5355 5355 5355 5355 5355 
Note: 1. *, ** and *** represent significance at the 0.05, 0.01 and 0.001 levels, respectively. 
            2. IE represents institutional environment factors, TE denotes top executive, and TE pay was 
            measured in the log value.   
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Table 5: The impact of top executive compensation and subnational institutions 
on share of OFDI in total investment  
Variables Dependent variable: Share of OFDI in total investment 
 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 Model 12 Model 13 Model 14 
TE pay 
 0.026*** 
(0.004) 
0.019*** 
(0.004) 
0.021*** 
(0.004) 
0.005** 
(0.003) 
0.007** 
(0.003) 
0.007** 
(0.004) 
 
TE equity ownership 
 
 
0.386*** 
 (0.102) 
0.375*** 
(0.102) 
0.386*** 
(0.102) 
0.092** 
(0.033) 
0.039 
(0.161) 
0.089 
(0.206) 
Index of product markets (IE1)  0.013*** 
(0.003)   
0.010* 
(0.003)   
Index of factor markets (IE2)  
 
0.015*** 
(0.001) 
  0.009* 
(0.003) 
 
Index of market intermediate 
institutions and legal systems (IE3) 
 
 
 0.008*** 
(0.001) 
  0.005* 
(0.003) 
TE pay X IE1   
  
 0.001* 
(0.000) 
  
TE equity ownership X IE1  
  
 0.042* 
(0.006) 
  
TE pay X IE2   
  
  0.000 
(0.004) 
 
TE equity ownership X IE2  
  
  0.051* 
(0.029) 
 
TE pay X IE3  
  
   0.001 
(0.001) 
TE equity ownership X IE3   
  
   0.061* 
(0.028) 
 
Control variables  
 
  
    
Policy orientated industry 
 
 
0.042*** 
(0.006) 
 
0.051*** 
(0.007) 
 
0.059*** 
(0.007) 
 
0.058*** 
(0.007) 
 
0.050*** 
(0.014) 
 
0.054*** 
(0.014) 
 
0.067*** 
(0.014) 
 
State shareholdings  0.001 
(0.002) 
0.001 
(0.002) 
0.001 
(0.002) 
 0.001 
(0.002) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
0.001 
(0.002) 
0.001 
(0.002) 
Foreign shareholdings  
0.004*** 
(0.004) 
0.004*** 
(0.005) 
0.004*** 
(0.005) 
0.004*** 
(0.005) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
0.001 
(0.005) 
0.001 
(0.006) 
Board size 
 
-0.009*** 
(0.002) 
-0.007*** 
(0.002) 
-0.006** 
(0.002) 
-0.006** 
(0.002) 
-0.002 
(0.002) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.002  
(0.002) 
Independent directors 
  
0.009 
(0.044) 
0.008 
(0.051) 
0.007 
(0.050) 
0.007 
(0.043) 
0.008 
(0.043) 
0.016 
(0.027) 
0.016 
(0.046) 
TEs’ international 
experience  
0.069** 
(0.023) 
0.073** 
(0.024) 
0.071** 
(0.024) 
0.071** 
(0.024) 
0.006 
(0.020) 
0.011 
(0.012) 
0.004 
(0.012) 
Intangible assets 
 
 
-0.226*** 
(0.057) 
 
-0.241*** 
(0.058) 
 
-0.223** 
(0.058) 
 
-0.214** 
(0.058) 
 
-0.056* 
(0.014) 
 
-0.072* 
(0.051) 
 
-0.096* 
(0.060) 
 
Firm size  
0.027*** 
(0.003) 
0.019*** 
(0.003) 
0.018*** 
(0.002) 
0.019*** 
(0.003) 
0.007** 
(0.003) 
0.005** 
(0.003) 
0.016*** 
(0.004) 
Firm age 
 
0.004*** 
(0.001) 
 
0.003*** 
(0.001) 
 
0.003*** 
(0.001) 
 
0.003*** 
(0.001) 
 
0.001** 
(0.002) 
 
0.001** 
(0.002) 
 
0.003* 
(0.002) 
 
Return on assets(t-1) 
 
0.016 
(0.042) 
 
0.017 
(0.043) 
 
0.021 
(0.044) 
 
   0.026 
(0.044) 
 
0.020 
(0.026) 
 
0.016 
(0.026) 
 
0.011 
(0.032) 
 
Adjusted R-squared 0.092 0.125 0.114 0.135 0.158 0.161 0.139 
Sargan test  0.124 0.203 0.182 0.216 0.183 0.106 0.112 
Observations 5355 5355 5355 5355 5355 5355 5355 
Note: 1. *, ** and *** represent significance at the 0.05, 0.01 and 0.001 levels, respectively. 
          2. IE represents institutional environment factors, TE denotes top executive, and TE pay was measured in 
              the log value.   
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Appendix Table 1: Description of the NERI Indices 
 
1 The relationship between government and markets  
  1a Government allocation of resources in GDP  
  1b Tax and non-tax burden of farmers  
  1c Government intervention in enterprises  
  1d Non-tax burden on enterprises  
  1e Size of government  
 
2 Development of non-state enterprise sector 
  2a Share of the non-state sector in gross industrial output  
  2b Share of the non-state sector in total investment in fixed assets  
  2c Share of the non-state sector in total urban employment  
 
3 Development of product markets  
  3a Percentage of products with market-determined prices 
  3b Degree of local protectionism or trade barriers 
 
4 Development of factor markets  
  4a Development of the financial sector  
  4b Degree of absorption of foreign capital  
  4c Labor mobility 
  4d Development of the technology market  
 
5 Market-intermediate institutions and legal framework  
  5a Development of market intermediaries (share of lawyers in 
    local population and share of independent accountants in local  
    population)  
  5b Protection of intellectual property rights  
  5c Protection of consumers’ rights  
  
Source: Fan, Wang, & Zhu, (2010). NERI Index of Marketization for China’s Provinces: 2009 Report (in Chinese), 
Economic Science Press, Beijing. 
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Appendix 2: NERI indices for year 2007 
Province 
Product 
market 
index 
Factor 
market 
index 
Market-Intermediate 
institution and legal 
systems  index 
Qinghai 5.52 3.9 2.79 
Shanxi(3) 6.34 3.97 4.99 
Ningxia 6.71 3.46 3.8 
Yunnan 6.97 4.74 4.63 
Guangxi 7.1 3.19 4.23 
Xinjiang 8.53 2.42 4.56 
Hainan 8.59 4.2 3.87 
Hebei 8.68 3.65 5.27 
Beijing 8.73 11.09 8.41 
Sichuan 8.94 5.03 5.96 
Anhui 8.98 4.82 5.99 
Heilongjiang 8.99 3.41 5.46 
Guizhou 9.02 3.07 3.76 
Gansu 9.06 4.02 3.79 
Shanxi(1) 9.25 3.77 4.78 
Tianjin 9.31 11.42 9.92 
Jiangsu 9.33 7.87 11.5 
Chongqing 9.38 7.17 5.61 
Inner Mongolia 9.43 3.63 4.5 
Hubei 9.46 5.22 5.79 
Liaoning 9.58 8.14 7.23 
Henan 9.6 4.14 4.99 
Shandong 9.71 5.8 7.37 
Shanghai 9.78 11.93 16.61 
Hunan 9.81 5.4 4.32 
Jiangxi 9.93 4.81 4.75 
Jilin 9.97 3.1 5.37 
Guangdong 10.21 9.02 12.59 
Fujian 10.58 8.15 6.92 
Zhejiang 10.61 9.24 13.89 
Note: Provinces in the table are sorted in ascending order of the index of product markets;  
Shanxi (1) represents the province with Taiyuan as its capital,  
while Shanxi (3) represents the province with Xian as its capital. These are different names in Chinese. The 
number in brackets represents the tone in Chinese pronunciation.  
 
 
